SABIIA - Sistema Aberto e Integrado de Informação em Agricultura (Sabiia)

Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe; Schilizzi, Steven.

We argue that previous assessments of discriminatory-price conservation auctions may have systematically overestimated their performance relative to uniform-payment schemes due to an inappropriate counterfactual comparison. We demonstrate that the cost curve (and not the bid curve) is the relevant supply curve when a uniform payment is offered and provide a theoretically rigorous counterfactual based on that insight. We estimate that the performance of BushTender may have been overrated by more than 50%.

AUCTIONING OUTCOME-BASED CONSERVATION CONTRACTS

Palavras-chave: Auctions; Procurement; Tenders; Conservation; Economic experiments; Model validation; Plus: assessment method; Agricultural policy; Environmental policy; Market-based instruments; Environmental Economics and Policy; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C91; C92; D44; Q24; Q28.

Ano: 2011

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/100885

Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe; Schilizzi, Steven; Breustedt, Gunnar.

This paper explores two ideas to enhance the performance of agri-environmental contracting schemes: linking contract payments to environmental outcomes and putting the contracts up for tender. This paper investigates whether there are any gains to be had by combining the benefits of both approaches. Controlled lab experiments were run in two countries, systematically varying the rate at which payments are linked to environmental outcomes. This paper clarifies the conditions under which the benefits from combining tenders with incentive payments outweigh the costs.

Bundled Ecosystem Markets – Are They The Future?

Palavras-chave: Conservation tenders; Auctions; Incentive contracts; Agricultural policy; Environmental policy; Market-based instruments; Experimental economics; Auktionen; Ausschreibungsverfahren; Agrar-Umweltverträge; Agrar-Umweltpolitik; Anreizverträge; Experimentelle Ökonomie; Agribusiness; Agricultural and Food Policy; Agricultural Finance; Demand and Price Analysis; Political Economy.

Ano: 2011

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/114523

Greenhalgh, Suzie.

Bundled ecosystem markets may be the next big buzz in environmental policy and ecosystem conservation and restoration. But what does it mean? And what is the feasibility of these markets? While single service ecosystem markets are proliferating, bundled ecosystem markets are not. Using some ‘enabling’ and ‘operating’ conditions identified for various single ecosystem markets, I will see how these conditions hold as you move to bundled ecosystem markets. I also outline some of the hurdles that confront the development of bundled ecosystem markets and what may need to be reconciled to move these markets forward. This article is aimed at stimulating greater thinking and promoting more exploration by the policy and research community into the development of...

Does tendering conservation contracts with performance payments generate additional benefits?

Palavras-chave: Bundled ecosystem markets; Market-based instruments; Policy; Trading; Ecosystem services; Markets; Environmental Economics and Policy.

Ano: 2008

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6166

Schilizzi, Steven; Breustedt, Gunnar; Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe.

Policy makers aiming to get private landholders to supply non-marketed environmental services may need to provide efficient economic incentives. Two ideas have been explored to achieve this: linking contract payments to environmental outcomes and submitting the contracts to competitive tender. This paper investigates whether there are any gains to be had by combining the potential benefits of both approaches. Landholders’ risk aversion to only partially controlled outcomes may offset incentive effects if the fall in participation outweighs any increases in individual effort. Controlled lab experiments were designed on the basis of a theoretical model and were run in two countries, with varying rates of payments linked to environmental outcomes. Results...

Ano: 2011

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/100883

Environmental Economics

Stavins, Robert N..

This article, prepared for the forthcoming second edition of the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, provides an overview of the economics of environmental policy. Included are the setting of goals and targets, notably the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, and the related method of assessment known as benefit-cost analysis. Also reviewed are the means of environmental policy, that is, the choice of specific policy instruments, featuring an examination of potential criteria for assessing alternative instruments, with focus on cost-effectiveness. The theoretical foundations and experiential highlights of individual instruments are reviewed, including conventional command-and-control mechanisms and market-based instruments.

Influences on bid prices in the Vegetation Incentives Program

Palavras-chave: Environmental economics; Efficiency; Cost-effectiveness; Benefit-cost analysis; Market-based instruments; Tradeable permits; Pollution taxes; Environmental Economics and Policy; K320; Q280; Q380; Q480.

Ano: 2004

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10841

Comerford, Emma.

In a conservation auction there are many possible influences on bid prices. This paper considers a range of factors that influenced the bids submitted to the Queensland Government's Vegetation Incentives Program (VIP). The relationships between total bid price and a variety of variables are examined. The VIP appears to be a unique example of a program that asks landholders to separate management and covenant costs in their tender. Forgoing payment on the covenant may be an indicator of low opportunity cost or altruism on the part of the landholder. Accordingly this paper also investigates the influences on covenant bids.

Market-Based Environmental Policies

Palavras-chave: Auctions; Market-based instruments; Vegetation management; Conservation covenants; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy.

Ano: 2007

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10421

Stavins, Robert N..

Some eighty years ago, economists first proposed the use of corrective taxes to internalize environmental and other externalities. Fifty years later, the portfolio of potential economic-incentive instruments was expanded to include quantity-based mechanisms--tradable permits. Thus, economic-incentive approaches to environmental protection are clearly not a new policy idea, and over the past two decades, they have held varying degrees of prominence in environmental policy discussions. This paper summarizes U.S. experiences with such market-based policy instruments, including: pollution charges; deposit-refund systems; tradable permits; market barrier reductions; and government subsidy reductions. No particular form of government intervention, no individual...

Policy Innovation and Institutional Capacity Building: Putting Market-Based Instruments Into Practice in South Australia

Palavras-chave: Market-based instruments; Pigovian taxes; Tradable permits; Deposit-refund systems; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q28.

Ano: 1998

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10506

Shi, Tian.

As market-based instruments (MBIs) become a buzzword, there is an emerging expectation among policy makers and natural resource managers that MBIs should be more widely adopted. However, without the change of existing ideas and institutions, governments tend to continue to use the default regulatory and voluntary instruments. This paper provides an overview of policy instruments and the general expectations about the instrument choice when governments face policy implementation. Although it does not provide specific choice of individual instruments, some key issues and opportunities are identified for the wide adoption of MBIs in South Australia for sustainable NRM and economic development.

Should we combine incentive payments and tendering for efficiently purchasing conservation services from landholders?

Palavras-chave: Market-based instruments; Institutional capacity building; Policy instrument; Instrument compatibility; Natural resource management; South Australia; Political Economy.

Ano: 2007

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10373

Schilizzi, Steven; Breustedt, Gunnar; Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe.

Policy makers aiming to get private landholders to provide non-marketed environmental services need to provide efficient economic incentives. Two ideas have been explored to achieve this: linking contract payments to environmental outcomes and putting the contracts up for tender. This paper investigates whether there are any gains to be had by combining the benefits of both approaches. Landholder risk aversion may offset incentive effects if the fall in participation outweighs any increases in individual effort. Using controlled lab experiments in two countries and across four subject groups, and systematically varying the rate at which payments are linked to uncertain outcomes, this paper clarifies the conditions under which incentives overcome...

The adoption of market-based instruments for resource management: Three case studies

Ano: 2010

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/59159

Sinner, Jim; Fenemor, Andrew; Palmer, James.

Market-based instruments (MBIs) for resource management create financial incentives for people and businesses to use resources more efficiently, within a regulatory context designed to ensure that ecological, social and cultural objectives are also met. Three case studies were done to identify factors influencing the adoption or rejection of market-based instruments in New Zealand. Case studies included Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) for New Zealand's inshore fisheries, Transferable Water Permits (TWPs) in Tasman District and Waikato Region, and charges for occupation of coastal space at both the national and regional levels in New Zealand. This paper provides a summary of findings from these case studies. These include: MBIs are difficult to...

The Use of Economic Incentives in Developing Countries: Lessons from International Experience with Industrial Air Pollution

Palavras-chave: Market-based instruments; ITQ; Transferable water permits; Coastal occupation charges; Agribusiness; Agricultural and Food Policy; Consumer/Household Economics; Crop Production/Industries; Environmental Economics and Policy; Farm Management.

Ano: 2005

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/98495

Blackman, Allen; Harrington, Winston.

To what extent should developing countries eschew conventional command and control environmental regulation that is increasingly seen as inefficient and rely instead on economic incentives? This paper addresses this question as it pertains to industrial air pollution. The paper discusses the advantages and disadvantages of various economic incentive instruments, presents in-depth case studies of their application in Sweden, the United States, China, and Poland, and proposes a number of policy guidelines. We argue that both design deficiencies and pervasive constraints on monitoring and enforcement impede the effectiveness of economic instruments in developing countries. The latter are difficult to rectify, at least in the medium term. As a result, tradable...

Using Environmental Offsets in Wetlands Management

Palavras-chave: Environmental policy; Economic incentives; Market-based instruments; Developing countries; Air pollution; Sweden; China; Poland; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q25; Q28.

Ano: 1999

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10601

Duncan, Roderick; Morrison, Mark.

Environmental offsets have been proposed as a technique for managing the environmental impacts of new developments in regions that are not in compliance with environmental standards. By requiring developers to 'offset' any impacts by purchasing 'environmental credits', environmental quality can be maintained or even improved. Environmental offsets have a lot of intuitive appeal, and are being used widely in the USA, Australia and other countries. However there is at present no robust theoretical framework for analyzing the use of offsets, which has led to some of the weaknesses of existing programs and criticisms against the use of offsets. We present an economic model for designing offset programs that is based on identifying and valuing environmental...